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The Okhrana is one of the great grey areas of late tsarist history. ‘Okhrana’ or more 
accurately ‘okhranka’ was the nickname for a loosely bound collection of police and 
intelligence agencies waging war against the forces of revolution and left-wing terror in 
the Russian Empire from 1881 to 1917.2 Like many other espionage agencies, the secrecy 
surrounding the Okhrana meant that it has been the subject of rumour, exaggeration and 
myth.3 It has been depicted as a progenitor of the Cheka,4 yet its members were 
systematically arrested and executed by the early Soviet secret police. It was frequently 
referred to by the totalitarian school as a prototype of the all-seeing Big Brother police 
system,5 and yet the Okhrana was a relatively small organisation– with only a few 
thousand employees in a country of over 140 million people. It has been cited both as one 
of the principal causes of the revolution and as the pillar of Russian reaction, and yet it 
was reviled by revolutionaries and reactionaries alike. Many have presented the Okhrana 
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as evidence of the anachronistic and backward nature of the late Imperial regime,6 and 
yet with its records have also revealed that it was a technological and methodological 
innovator in the arts of political control and surveillance.7 
 To gain a more realistic picture of this paradoxical organisation we must first look 
at its origins. Most of the Okhrana’s leading officers were recruited from– and members 
of– the Separate Corps of Gendarmes. This was a paramilitary force distinct from the 
ordinary police. Up until 1880 the Separate Corps enjoyed a great deal of independence– 
it was subordinated only to a special office of the tsar’s court: the Third Section. Some 
have seen the Third Section as evidence of a uniquely Russian brand of police despotism, 
yet it was based on similar organisations in Metternich’s Austria and Napoleonic France, 
and part of a pan-European process systematising modern police methods.8 The Third 
Section was tsar Nicholas I’s response to the liberal Decembrist uprising of 1825: whereby 
the emperor borrowed and re-tailored his opponents’ ideas to prove that autocracy was 
the best possible means of securing the greatest happiness for the greatest number. The 
true founder of the Third Section, Count A. Kh. Benckendorff, frequently reminded the 
gendarmes of their noble mission: ‘Every man will see in you an official who through my 
agency can bring the voice of suffering mankind to the throne of the tsars, who can 
instantly place the defenceless and voiceless citizen under the protection of the sovereign 
emperor.’9  
However, the gendarmerie was soon distracted from this utopian dream, notably 
by threats to the status quo from Polish parts of the empire in the 1830s and 1860s and 
from a burgeoning radical intelligentsia in Russia proper. In response the Third Section 
took on the role of a more mundane security police agency– as defenders of the state 
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rather than guardians of the people’s happiness. Consequently, the benign posturing of 
the new higher police force came to be viewed by many as a purely cynical method of 
socio-political control; and not without some justice: ‘Public opinion,’ the founder noted, 
‘has the same importance for the authorities as a topographical map has for an army 
commander.’10 In other words gendarme surveillance of the ‘mood of the populace’ 
(nastroenie naseleniia)  was merely a means of defence against– rather than a purer form of– 
democracy. The gendarmes’ particular brand of meddlesome altruism won them few 
friends amongst the new intelligentsia, who referred to these snoops as ‘unwanted guests’.  
Benckendorff envisaged an organisation that would be ‘feared and respected.’ 
Events in the 1860s and ’70s seemed to indicate that the Third Section had failed on both 
counts. The old methods of open, demonstrative repression through arrest, exile and 
censorship were rendered partially obsolete by a number of new developments. Society 
had changed: the growing pace of urbanisation, a free peasantry and the granting of 
university autonomy in the 1860s gave birth to more radical, home-grown ideologies: 
particularly what Turgenev dubbed ‘nihilism’– based on D. I. Pisarev’s calls for society 
and state to be smashed and built anew on a scientific basis, rejecting the passive 
acceptance of all tradition and superstition, including old codes of morality and respect 
for authority. Technology was also a crucial factor in this process: rail travel, the high-
speed rotary printing press (1865) and the invention of dynamite (1866) gave the 
radicalised opposition groups mobility, the chance for wider dissemination of their ideas 
and a weapon to intimidate the flesh and blood representatives of autocratic power. And 
the tactics of oppositionists had changed. Police repression was substantially to blame for 
this: as radical groups moved away from esoteric intellectual debate, calling themselves 
Populists, they sought to engage and learn from the peasantry and ‘ordinary’ Russian 
folk. The gendarmerie responded with wide-scale arrests of the young radical agitators 
‘going to the people’ (particularly in the summer of 1874). Consequently, one section of 
the opposition movement turned away from open non-violent action and devoted itself to 
conspiracy and terror. By 1879 the new elements had crystallised into the People’s Will 
movement. The gendarmerie was ill-equipped to deal with the changed methods of 
subversion: decked in rather extravagant blue uniforms, with white gloves, frock-coat and 
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sultan spike of white horse hair on the lamb skin parade helmet they were hardly what 
you would call a secret police force. Their founding directives in 1826 explicitly rejected 
conspiratorial work as dishonourable. People’s Will had good reason to believe that 
through secret cells – so-called piaterki (‘groups of five’)– they had identified tsardom’s 
Achilles heel.  
Moreover, the training of gendarmes equipped them with only a shallow 
understanding of the difference between harmless freethinking and hostile radicalism. For 
example, the head of the gendarmerie in Kiev at the turn of the twentieth century, 
General V. D. Novitskii, was said to be so out of touch that he considered the poetry of 
Lermontov and Pushkin to be subversive and to have never heard of Marx, Plekhanov or 
Lenin. 
Added to this was the fact that civil rights in Imperial Russia were codified for the 
first time in 1864. This seemed to vindicate tsarist claims that the autocratic legal system 
was the mildest in Europe. The state’s ability to crush political unrest through judicial 
methods was significantly curtailed at the very moment when violent attacks on the state 
began. Many judges and juries of a liberal persuasion tended to allow political 
considerations to influence verdicts: for example, at the Nechaev trial of 1871 60 of the 87 
were cleared despite clear evidence against them and in 1878 Vera Zasulich was 
acquitted of the attempted murder of the Petersburg Governor-General despite the fact 
that she did not even try to conceal her guilt. It seemed that the selective assassination of 
leading government figures – what Populists called the ‘propaganda of the deed’– would 
‘give history a push’ and topple the out-dated regime. This campaign culminated in the 
assassination of tsar Alexander II in 1881. 
 And yet the tsarist regime did not collapse. The revolution-reaction duet merely 
grew in complexity. Just as police repression prompted the birth of People’s Will, so in 
turn the latter’s wave of terror prompted a reconstruction of the security police system. 
Starting from the 1870s the state created loopholes in the liberal legal system, which 
allowed governors to declare states of emergency. The governors could then grant extra-
legal powers of search and arrest to the gendarmerie and police, and to three agencies in 
particular: St Petersburg, Moscow and Warsaw ‘security sections’ (okhrannye otdeleniia). The 
government attempted to rationalise and harmonise the hotchpotch of laws and 
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institutions by means of the Security Law (Polozhenie ob okhrane) of 14 August 1881 and the 
unification of all policing institutions under the Interior Ministry’s Department of Police. 
This was intended in many ways as a reformist gesture: the hated Third Section was, after 
all, dissolved in 1880 in an attempt to rein in the arbitrary powers of the political police. 
Thus, the direct connection of the gendarmerie to the tsar was severed. Divorced from 
court milieu political policing was to be a cog in the bureaucratic machine.  These 
measures were intended as a preliminary to the creation of a consultative legislative 
assembly. ‘Ironically, such suspensions [i.e. the security laws] were the hallmark of 
transitions from absolutist to constitutional rule, from early modern Polizeistaat, or 
rationalised absolutism, to the rule of law.’11 Yet, inevitably given the timing of events, the 
new system was viewed as a step backwards, a knee-jerk reaction to terrorism. The 
bureaucratic reforms combined with the devastating wave of political arrests in the early 
1880s created the impression that Alexander III had created a vast new ‘security’ (okhrana) 
organisation: ‘all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-capable.’12 There was no official 
government agency called ‘the Okhrana’ (okhranka). Yet the term surfaced at this point in 
time as a convenient soubriquet, coined by the opposition to denote the confusing mass of 
secret police agencies. This invention allowed them to put a name to the intangible, 
invisible, central pillar of Russian reaction. 
On the face of things the radical opposition had good reason to fear the new 
organisation: as a section of the Interior Ministry it was now part of the largest 
government institution outside the army. By 1900 the Department of Police had 50,000 
employees. With the assistance of the commune watchmen, there were roughly 100,000 
policemen in the Russian Empire. The Interior Minister also had control of the entire 
15,000-strong Corps of Gendarmes. The Interior Minister was directly answerable to the 
tsar alone. A series of gifted, forceful (to the point of ruthlessness) and courageous Interior 
Ministers, such as V.K.Plehve, P.N.Durnovo and P.A.Stolypin, took an active interest in 
the war against subversives and came to embody the tsarist regime’s “terrible mystique of 
                                                
11 J. W. Daly, ‘On the Significance of Emergency Legislation in Late Imperial Russia.’ Slavic Review, 54, 
no.3 (1995), p.603. See also: P. Waldron, ‘States of Emergency: Autocracy and Emergency Legislation, 
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power”.13 Many Okhrana officers relished this fearsome reputation: ‘scattered throughout 
the country, with its departments, investigation points, and gendarme directorates, 
patiently listening to the reports of countless spies and scouts, constantly arresting, 
hanging and deporting, strong in its fund of bottomless human baseness, strong in the 
amount of blood and tears shed, strong in the annual ten million ruble fund, the Okhrana 
affected directly and indirectly all the measures of the government… The Okhrana set 
the tone…’14 
Nevertheless, the fight was far from over. George Kennan remarked on Russia in 
the 1890s that ‘we have at present a strange spectacle. Before our eyes there has taken 
place something like a duel between the mightiest power on earth armed with all the 
attributes of authority on one side, and an insignificant gang of discharged telegraph 
operators, half-educated seminarists, high-school boys, and university students, miserable 
little Jews and loose women on the other, and in this unequal contest success was far from 
being on the side of strength.’15  
But was this really an ‘unequal contest’? Russian nihilistic Populism did not fade 
away, it fused with Marxism, refined its methods and gave birth to the Socialist 
Revolutionary party and a ferocious campaign of terror that would claim the lives of over 
10,000 government officials from 1901 to 1914.  Contrary to popular perceptions, Russia 
was relatively undergoverned: the tsarist empire at the turn of the century had only 4 
administrators per thousand inhabitants compared to 7.3 in England and Wales, 12.6 in 
Imperial Germany and 17.6 in France. To be sure, the Corps of Gendarmes was on the 
face of things an imposing political police force, with a staff of 15,000. However, only 
2,500 were even vaguely connected to the political security policing (and most these were 
not involved in actual investigative work). As a force for social control the Okhrana was 
even weaker: In the villages it was dependent on the local police for all information. Even 
in the cities the co-operation of the ordinary police was essential in performing arrests and 
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mundane surveillance work.16 Russian per capita spending on the police was half that of 
Austria-Hungary, Italy and France and a sixth that of Great Britain. As a result ordinary 
Russian police were extremely under-equipped, poorly educated and paid less than most 
factory workers. In the countryside one constable with a few sergeants might have a beat 
of 1,800 square kilometres encompassing fifty to a hundred thousand inhabitants. So, 
instead of walking a beat, three-quarters of Russian police constables, even in the cities, 
were positioned at stationary posts and supposedly ‘slept like hibernating bears’.17 
The Okhrana was not, therefore, an administrative megalith. The centralised and 
specialised structure– not the size– was the source of its power. Overall supervision of all 
police affairs, including Okhrana operations, was carried out by Department of Police at 
its headquarters on the Fontanka canal (no.16) in St Petersburg. Staff steadily increased in 
number over the decades from 161 full time employees in 1895 to 387 in 1914. The 
overwhelming majority of these officials, however, were not directly involved in security 
police affairs– they worked instead in nine Secretariats dealing with non-political and 
non-secret operations. A separate office inside the Department of Police exclusively 
devoted to secret political security policing– the Special Section (Osobyi otdel)– was only 
created in 1898. This occupied the entire top floor of the Fontanka HQ. As its name 
indicated the Special Section was different from the other offices of the Department of 
Police– it was closed to outsiders with an office staff of about 15 intelligence officers 
representing an elite,  ‘a breed apart’.18 
Beneath the Special Section, and the principal source of information, were the 
‘Security Sections’. These were the active directors of the physical collation of intelligence 
and the executive arm of police repression. They carried out surveillance, infiltration, 
arrests and interrogations. Officers in these sections were usually gendarmes with a 
military education. Directors of the Department of Police, in contrast, were usually 
university educated, legally trained, career bureaucrats. The Special Section meanwhile 
involved a mixture of the two types of personnel and provided a link between operatives 
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in the field and analysts at HQ. Security Sections– outside St Petersburg, Moscow and 
Warsaw– were only created in the rest of the major cities of the empire in 1902.  
Employees of Security Sections consisted of three types of personnel: At the top 
were the gendarmes and bureaucrats who acted as directors, case-officers, interrogators, 
recruiters, record-keepers, clerks and analysts. They came to be known as okhranniki.  
Secondly there were surveillance operatives (known as ‘external agents’) who secretly 
tailed ‘political unreliables’ and acted as bodyguards to government officials. Many of 
their training manuals survive and seem to have been imitated by the KGB.19 These show 
that external agents received highly competent training in the art of surveillance. 
Nevertheless, they had their critics: Their appearance was a curious juxtaposition of the 
inconspicuous and the blindly obvious. Prime Minister Sergei Witte noted that they ‘can 
usually be spotted by their umbrellas and bowler hats.’20 They usually wore ex-army issue 
greatcoats, which were easily recognisable. This poor attempt at urban camouflage gave 
rise to another nickname: ‘Green coats’. All the same, they were often the only source of 
information, and the very rumour of their existence tended to unnerve revolutionary 
conspirators. The third breed of spy was the infamous ‘internal agent’: informers who 
were in contact with– or even   members of– the political opposition. The internal agency 
was the most valuable source: ‘without the Internal Agency’ wrote General Aleksandr 
Gerasimov (the Petersburg Okhrana chief, 1905-09), ‘the director of the political police is 
blind. The internal life of a revolutionary organisation, acting underground, is a wholly 
separate world, completely inaccessible to those who do not become members of the 
organisations.’21 Rather than sending loyal police officers out to infiltrate revolutionary 
cells, it was simpler for the Okhrana to scout for spies amongst ready-made members of 
the political underworld. These agents would usually be recruited after arrest. The 
technique of ‘turning’ a committed radical into a loyal servant of the Okhrana, developed 
at the tail end of the nineteenth century, involved subjecting an arrested radical to a 
                                                
19 See: C.Andrew & V.Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe and the West (London, 
1999), p.31 with reference to Dmitrii Gavrilovich Evseev, Basic Tenets of Intelligence & idem, How to 
Conduct Intelligence.  (Training manuals for the Chekisty in the 1920s). Compare: ‘Essential Handbook for 
KGB Agents,’ (published in London by the industrial Information Index, 1978), pp.23-40, ‘Instruction for 
External Surveillance’; & instructions on the Okhrana’s external surveillance: ‘Instruktsiia no.298’, 
Hoover, Okhrana, box 41, folder VIf. 
20 Sergei Witte, The Memoirs of Count Witte, ed. Sidney Harcave (New York, 1990), p.433. 
21 A. V. Gerasimov: Na lezvii s terroristami (Paris, 1985), p.56. 
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carefully paced, individually tailored ‘seduction’: a mixture of solitary confinement, tea 
and sympathy, threats of dire punishment (prison, exile or execution), and the promise of 
serving a good cause once more, or of money, power, prestige etc.  
 Secrecy was the key to the entire plan of attack. Officially, the very existence of 
the Special Section was secret. The location of a city’s Security Section was, on the other 
hand, usually well-known; nevertheless, these fortified offices maintained a multitude of 
points of entry and exit so that officers could sneak in and out unnoticed. Group 
photographs of Okhrana employees were banned after one picture fell into the hands of 
the revolutionary underground in 1911. Most Okhrana chiefs wore plain clothes rather 
than gendarme uniform, they frequently changed address and often lived under an 
assumed name. 
There was even a furtive air to the tsarist regime’s acts of political repression. Like 
the NKVD, the Okhrana preferred to perform its arrests at night. Security Section 
officers often avoided attending these arrests in person in order preserve their anonymity. 
Bail was usually set at a large amount. If evidence was too flimsy for a trial the political 
prisoners were either released or banished from the locality in secret. Arrests, whenever 
possible, were performed simultaneously to prevent the opportunity for the arrestees to 
destroy any compromising materials. These operations were referred to by the suitably 
opaque bureaucratic term ‘liquidation’. A liquidation would thus often lead to the sudden 
disappearance of a whole group of acquaintances over night. It is not difficult to see why 
the term began to take on the sinister connotations that reached fruition in the Stalin era.   
One of the most secret aspects of the Okhrana’s work was the establishment of so-
called ‘Black Cabinets’. These were concealed offices based at major postal depots, which 
supplied the political police with access to all correspondence by mail and telegraph 
throughout the empire. The Okhrana’s legal right to intercept and copy mail, known as 
perlustration, was tenuous to say the least, and consecutive Ministers of the Interior were 
obliged to deny that the practice even took place. Nevertheless, most opponents of the 
tsarist regime knew full well that the authorities read their mail.  
The high level of secrecy meant that revolutionaries could only guess at the size 
and nature of the Okhrana. Consequently, the opposition seem to have over-estimated 
the omniscience of the secret police. Most thought that there was a Black Cabinet in 
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every city and even many towns of the empire. When one Soviet historian dredged the 
archives he only found evidence of seven such offices with a grand total of 49 employees 
before 1914; reports of others, he noted, ‘were sheer hallucinations.’22 Activists in the 
political underground imagined the cities to be infested with watchers and informers, and 
feared that their ranks were riddled with traitors. Early detractors of the Okhrana 
estimated that it employed up to 40,000 spies and referred to it as the most important 
prop to the tsarist regime. Yet when the police archives fell into the hands of the 
Provisional Government in 1917 they only managed to uncover 600 informers. Recent 
surveys of the archives have revealed that the Department of Police never employed more 
than 2,000 informers at any one time and most of these were not high-level spies.23 The 
entire Okhrana budget usually accounted for less than ten percent of the total 
expenditure on police, reaching a peak of around five million rubles in 1914: generous, 
but hardly what one would expect for a ‘police-state’. 
This level of expense on the Okhrana was shared between a reasonably modest 
number of agents.  St Petersburg Security Section at its height had 750 employees: 25 
officials of officer rank, 250 detectives engaged in bodyguard duties, 220 shadowing 
‘political unreliables’ and performing various other miscellaneous tasks, 70 case officers 
and intelligence analysts, and 200 informers. St Petersburg’s security force was about 
twice the size of the Moscow branch. The Okhrana had a ‘Foreign Agency’ based in 
Paris, which became notorious in western Europe. Yet this branch was also rather small– 
with four case officers, 40 detectives and 25 secret agents. The entire Okhrana outside 
these three centres probably amounted to little more than a thousand employees. Low 
staff numbers may well have been the key to their success: It meant that salaries were high 
and consequently they attracted more talented and ambitious officers than the ordinary 
police or military (though also, of course, a fair number who were greedy and 
unscrupulous). From 1905 to 1911 the Okhrana was used as a model for imitation by the 
other security services: the ordinary police, criminal investigations and military 
intelligence. 
                                                
22 R. Kantor, ‘K istorii chernykh kabinetov,’ Katorga i ssylka, vol.XXXVII (1927), p.93.  
23 Z.I. Peregudova, ‘‘Istochnik izucheniia sotsial-demokraticheskogo dvizheniia v Rossii’, Voprosy istorii, 
no.9 (1988), p.96. 
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 The okhranniki were imitated because they were pioneers in the science of modern 
espionage. Just as the 1860s brought technical innovations which strengthened subversive 
movements, the 1890s saw developments which greatly enhanced police counter-
subversion across the globe. The tsarist secret police were among the first in Europe to 
utilise new ‘tradecraft’ and technology such as fingerprinting, Bertillon’s anthropometric 
system24, photographic identification, photo-fits, code-breaking, bugs, phone taps, 
typewriters, telegraphy, bullet-proof vests, tear gas, ‘tranquilising guns’ etc.25 They also 
made prophetic warnings about the possible use of aeroplanes and trains for terrorist acts. 
Technological breakthroughs, ambitious personnel and the unscrupulous practise 
of conspiracy, espionage, disinformation and intimidation formed a potent combination. 
Most inside accounts depict the offices of the Okhrana as an incredibly dynamic milieu: 
‘like an enormous machine... the surveillance agents spied, the translators translated, the 
“region” wrote to the province, the “top secret” office tried to get copies of letters, the 
“clearing” office cleared, the office recorded and reported to higher authorities, and 
clerks dashed from office to office, they were always busy pounding typewriters, using 
hectographs, making inquiries, and writing endless memoranda.’ 26 The whole impression 
is of an organisation that never rested and never slept (indeed a large part of its business 
was conducted at night). 
When considered purely in terms of data collation the Okhrana’s intelligence 
output was exceedingly impressive: By 1900 the Special Section had amassed a card 
index of 55,000 names, a library of 5,000 revolutionary publications and 20,000 
photographs. By 1917 the card index was rumoured to contain up to three million names. 
Reports were regularly issued to the lower rungs of the Okhrana through twice monthly 
circulars and in a twice-weekly synopsis that was sent to the Minister of the Interior and 
the tsar. To disseminate a digested form of this information the Department of Police 
produced an ‘alphabetical list of persons under investigation’, a sort of who’s who of the 
revolutionary underground. The 1889 list had only 221 names and in 1899 still only 624 
names, but the 1910 list contained some 13,000 names in a series of huge grey volumes. 
                                                
24 The measuring and recording of physical dimensions of prisoners as a means of future identification– a 
system still employed by Interpol to this day. 
25 For example, see: A.T.Vassilyev, The Ochrana: The Russian Secret Police (London, 1930), pp.93-95. 
David Kahn, The Codebreakers: The story of Secret Writing (New York 1976). 
26Russiian, ‘The Work’, pp.4-5. 
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Department of Police’s card index was said to contain: ‘the names of all social activists, a 
card for almost any intelligent person who at one time in life had ever thought about 
politics.’27  
The Okhrana handled this data with greater subtlety and cunning than is often 
recognised. It has been viewed as a heavy-handed reactionary forefather of the Soviet 
terror machine. It has also been cited as evidence of the Russian Sonderweg or 
‘exceptionalism’.28 However, it must be borne in mind that the Okhrana was by no 
means unique in Europe and was an organisation that had originally based it methods on 
western systems of political surveillance and control.29 Rather than evolving into the 
Cheka, the Okhrana was the most notable case of discontinuity between tsarist and Soviet 
regimes. For example, while large sections of the lower ranking tsarist bureaucracy went 
on to work for the Soviet state (e.g., up to 90% of the staff of the Soviet Justice 
Commissariat were inherited from the tsarist regime), there are only a handful of 
documented examples of Okhrana officers joining the Cheka.30 In fact the revolutionary 
Cheka avoided any association with the counter-revolutionary Okhrana. By the mid-
1920s the Soviet secret police spearheaded a witch-hunt for former Okhrana agents as a 
means of ‘purging’ society. In contrast to the Cheka, attitudes of the okhranniki to their 
deadly enemies were surprisingly moderate. True, both policemen and revolutionaries 
were hardened by the protracted conspiratorial struggle. Yet even Soviet historians 
admitted that, aside from isolated examples, the Okhrana did not systematically employ 
any kind of torture. Attitudes varied of course, but S.P. Beletskii, a vigorous and 
aggressive police chief, gave a fairly typical insight into Okhrana attitudes to the radical 
opposition when he said that: ‘I understand the struggle with the revolution, with the 
enemies of the state order. It is an honest struggle, eyeball to eyeball. They blow us up 
                                                
27 Zhilinskii, “Organizatsiia i zhizn’” , p.267. 
28 See, for example: Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, pt. 3, pp.151-52.  R. Pipes, Russia Under the Old 
Regime (London, 1974), p.302. 
29 For a discussion of this see: Iain Lauchlan, Russian Hide-and-Seek. The Tsarist Secret Police in St 
Petersburg, 1906-1914 (Helsinki, 2002), pp.57-74. 
30 I.A.Zybin, the head of the Okhrana’s cryptology section continued work in this area for the Soviets. 
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and we prosecute them and penalise them.’31 This counter-subversive war was less bitter 
than under the early Soviets because the tsarist secret police pursued enemies of the state 
not ‘enemies of the people’; it aimed to contain, not annihilate, hostile elements; to 
control, not transform, society. 
The Okhrana’s attitudes to the liberal political parties have often been 
misunderstood. The small number of spies in the centre parties and the comments of 
police chiefs seem to indicate that the Okhrana, particularly between 1906 and 1914, was 
never as anti-liberal as its enemies claimed. Relations with the moderate reformist Kadet 
party were soured not due to their ‘liberalism’, but by the simple fact that the Kadets 
refused to condemn left-wing terrorists and that their slightly naïve demands for wider 
civil liberties might make them a Trojan horse for the revolutionary movement.32 The 
okhranniki felt that they had a fairly valid reason to cling to their authoritarian ways: they 
observed that revolutionary violence was worse after, rather than before, the liberal 
October Manifesto. They were driven by Stolypin’s conservative belief that: ‘The 
punishment of a few prevents a sea of blood.’33 In assisting Prime Minister Stolypin in the 
‘coup’ of 3 June 1907– whereby parliament was dissolved and a more conservative 
electoral law introduced– the Okhrana could, paradoxically, even be said to have helped 
to have saved the Duma from complete abolition at the hands of the tsar. Events 
following the brief flowering of liberty in 1917 seemed to vindicate the policy of extreme 
caution. 
The hostility of the liberal parties to the tsarist state has also perhaps been 
overstated. Russian moderates were shocked by the mass, spontaneous, revolutionary 
violence of 1905-07 and briefly recognised that they should fear the masses, “more than 
all the government’s executions, and must bless this regime which alone, with its bayonets 
and prisons, still protects us from the people’s wrath.”34 Many moderates even recognised 
after 1917 that they were as much to blame as the tsarist regime for failing to find a 
workable compromise between security and reform in the long run. 
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Rather than viewing the opposition groups as a single amorphous mass, the 
Okhrana established separate desks to study different parties: with tactics individually 
tailored and changing over time to meet the varying threats of mainly Socialist 
Revolutionaries (SRs), Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, anarchist communists, other Russian 
Social Democrats, Jewish workers’ parties, Polish socialists, Latvian SDs, Armenian 
nationalists (Droshak/Dashnaktsutiun), the Georgian Social Revolutionary federalist 
party (Sakartvelo), the Party of Active Resistance in Finland, Zionists, and the liberal 
Union of Liberation (1904-05). There is a tactile quality to the Okhrana studies of the 
revolutionary movement: SRs were registered on red cards, Social Democrats (SDs) on 
blue cards, anarchists on green cards, students on yellow cards and all others involved in 
politics on white cards. All houses in major cities were colour coded in the police records 
if the buildings had any connection with the movement of revolutionaries (not only if a 
political suspect lived there, but also if one ever happened to visit). The analysis of the 
tangled mass of ideologies, parties, individuals and social groups was graphically 
represented in vast spidery synoptic charts. 
The intelligence processed was not merely the fuel for repression: security police 
often sympathised with some of the grievances which gave rise to rebellion. For example, 
one gendarme reported in 1885 that: ‘Having had the opportunity to examine closely the 
life of factory workers I can find very little difference between their position and that of 
the earlier serfs; the same want, the same need, the same rights; the same contempt for 
their spiritual needs… [As yet the workers do not seem to be interested in politics, but] 
that evil day is coming closer and closer.’35 The pressure from such reports had led to 
progressive Bismarckian Factory Acts in 1882, 1885 and 1897 and the Factory 
Regulations of 1886 and Sickness and Accident Insurance Bill of 1912. The reasoning 
behind Okhrana conciliation was summed up by the head of the secret police in Moscow, 
Sergei Zubatov, thus, “economics are for the working man infinitely more important than 
any political principles. Satisfy the people’s requirements in this respect, and they will not 
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 15 
only not go into politics but will turn over to you all the radicals; revolutionaries without 
the mass are generals without an army.”36  
Zubatov’s mentalité goes some way to explain why in general the more 
sophisticated security police officers were loath to ‘liquidate’ revolutionary groups unless it 
was felt to be strictly necessary: indiscriminate arrests and harassment only tended to 
widen opposition to the tsarist regime. Consequently, the Okhrana appears to have given 
oppositionists a fair amount of room to slip in and out of the police net (as the pre-1917 
careers of Lenin, Stalin, Trotskii et al. testify). Yet, when the Okhrana did act, the impact 
on the revolutionary movement was profound. Plehve and Sudeikin decimated People’s 
Will in St Petersburg thanks to their spy Sergei Degaev; and A.S.Skandrakov, a director 
of Moscow Okhrana, was able to annihilate the leading cells of Black Repartition in 1884 
thanks to information of his spy, S.K.Belov. The Okhrana effectively took control of 
Socialist Revolutionary party’s terrorist campaign after 1905 when their agents Evno Azef 
in St Petersburg and Zinaida Zhuchenko in Moscow were promoted to the top rank of 
the SR Battle Organisation. The SR leadership fled abroad once more in the post-1905 
years of ‘Stolypin reaction’, but the Okhrana was never far behind: from 1910-14 of the 
140 registered members of the SR party in Paris fourteen were spies.37 
Police Director S.P.Beletskii pursued a particularly devious strategy of divide and 
rule against the Marxist Social Democratic party, so as to prevent the evolution of a 
broad-based popular socialist party on German lines. The key agent in this campaign was 
the party activist Roman Malinovskii, who was persuaded to shift from the moderate 
wing of the SDs (the Mensheviks) to the more extremist Bolshevik faction to promote 
division among Marxists and weaken their influence over the trades unions. Malinovskii 
went on to become the leading Bolshevik representative in the State Duma. The Okhrana 
produced detailed analyses of divisive issues within the SD Party. This entailed 
developing a holistic approach to intelligence gathering. For example, the secret police 
monitored not just their movements and beliefs, but their personal lives, and those of their 
families. The Bolshevik party was consequently riddled with Okhrana spies at the highest 
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level– including the editor of Pravda, Miron Chernomazov. It was rumoured that at the 
Prague conference of January 1912 ten out of the thirteen Bolshevik delegates were 
Okhrana informers. Allegations persist that Stalin himself was an Okhrana spy. 
 
The system backfires 
And so the Okhrana achieved great success. But at what cost? Repression decimated the 
political opposition at the expense of the moral credibility of the tsarist regime. The 
Okhrana was viewed as ‘the living symbol of all that is most repressive, cruel, mean and 
revolting in autocracy.’38  Consequently– to put it in newspeak– the regime lost the battle 
to win hearts and minds in the war against terror. The Habsburg Ambassador in St 
Petersburg, Count Alois von Aehrenthal, observed in the wake of the assassination of the 
Okhrana’s chief architect, V.K. von Plehve, in 1904 that: ‘The most striking aspect of the 
present situation is the total indifference of society to an event that constituted a heavy 
blow to the principles of the Government...I have found only totally indifferent people or 
people so cynical that they say that no other outcome was to be expected. People are 
prepared to say that further catastrophes similar to Plehve’s murder will be necessary in 
order to bring about a change of mind on the part of the highest authority.’39 
Secrecy enabled the Okhrana to sow suspicion and discord among the radical 
opposition, but it also aroused many of the same feelings inside the government itself. 
Well-to-do members of society, the court camarilla and senior officials (viz. the Okhrana’s 
natural constituency of supporters) looked askance at an organisation that concealed its 
activities even from Russian officialdom. 
Moral concerns over the actions of the Okhrana inside the government led to 
disputes over security police methods. Consequently a rival camp emerged inside the 
Separate Corps of Gendarmes. These opponents came mostly from those officers not 
directly involved in secret political work: those assigned to police provincial towns, canals, 
railways and border areas: the ‘crumbs’ of security work, as one bored gendarme put it. 
These gendarmes considered themselves to be of the old school and resented the fact that 
this new breed of secret policemen had pushed them into the second rank of political 
investigations. The okhranniki had little respect for the ordinary ‘blues’ who attempted to 
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penetrate the exclusive world of espionage: ‘In the environs of the Corps of Gendarmes 
some amateurs liked to play Sherlock Holmes. But in reality they usually proved to be 
bad detectives.’40  
The SR Viktor Chernov mocked this as a ‘battle of mice and frogs.’ In 1910 he 
characterised the contrasting behaviour of the two competing police cliques with a 
theatrical analogy: the conservative style of the reactionary camp in court under Kurlov 
versus the ‘reactionary style moderne’ of okhranniki under Stolypin:  ‘One proceeding 
proscenium, face to face, the other backstage: one proceeding officially– carrying out 
searches, seizures, arrests, formal investigations; the other – the exact opposite, 
conducting everything with a monopoly of secrecy…He who does not risk, does not gain– 
that is their slogan. The old gendarmerie would have had a completely different slogan– 
there’s would have been “A bird in the hand”… And so the friction grows. The Okhrana 
looks on the gendarmes with contempt. The gendarmes look on the okhranniki with 
mistrust. They speak different languages, they are “barbarians to one another”.’41 
These internal feuds meant that the supply of intelligence was sometimes tainted 
by the desire of police officials to cultivate powerful patrons. Patronage could elevate a 
talented security official to the helm of the Okhrana, but it also meant that amoral 
intriguers often rose to the top. Attempts to cultivate the support of courtiers were partly 
to blame for the rank flirtation of some maverick okhranniki with extreme right-wing 
parties between 1905 and 1914, the composition of dubious reports on the dire threat of 
Russian Freemasonry and their shenanigans involving shady characters in court such as 
Rasputin.42  
 
The human factor 
A second flaw in the machine-like system– based as it was on a frantic work-load and 
claustrophobic levels of secrecy, deceit and danger– was that it took a heavy toll on the 
human cogs. For example, the security police officials became, not surprisingly, the 
principal targets for terrorist attacks. Three out of the six Ministers of the Interior were 
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killed by terrorists between 1902 and 1911 (Sipiagin in 1902, Plehve in 1904 and Stolypin 
in 1911). Two attempts were made to kill another, P.N.Durnovo, in 1905 and 1906. 
During the more tumultuous months of 1905 police were often too afraid to leave their 
homes as Okhrana offices were subjected to bomb attacks; and assassins – prepared to 
take pot-shots at anyone in a uniform– could be hired in the western provinces for as little 
as three rubles.43 A police report in 1909 lists 190 high government officials who were 
victims of political attacks from 13 May 1903 to 2 March 1909, of these 58 were senior 
police officials (29 killed, 18 wounded and 11 other attempts). From February 1905 to 
May 1906 over 700 police officials of various ranks were killed in terrorist attacks.  
Even the Petersburg Okhrana officers who escaped assassination often ended their 
careers in disgrace as they were blamed for any security mishaps. The Director of the 
Department of Police, A.A.Lopukhin, was branded a murderer by his boss for failing to 
prevent the assassination of Grand Duke Sergei in 1905. The head of St Petersburg 
Security Section, L.N.Kremenetskii, lost his job after the Bloody Sunday massacre in 
1905, even though the atrocity was carried out by soldiers, and not the security police. 
A.V.Gerasimov himself was undone by the Azef scandal and the virulent wave and 
bureaucratic back-stabbing which followed it in 1909. And the Assistant Minister of the 
Interior, P.G.Kurlov, was dismissed for dereliction of duty after the assassination of his 
boss, the Prime Minister, Stolypin, by the Okhrana agent Dmitrii Bogrov in 1911. These 
cases were all the more poignant because all of they were the result of ‘turned’ spies 
betraying their Okhrana supervisors and rejoining the revolutionary cause. Okhrana 
officers were often literally literally hoist with its own petard. This danger had been 
apparent ever since the pioneer of the internal agent system, G.P.Sudeikin, was shot and 
beaten to death by a gang directed by one of his own secret agents, Sergei Degaev, in 
1883.  
The psychological pressure of this sort of work was immense. The Moscow revolt 
of December 1905 caused the head of the local Security Section, A.G.Peterson, to have a 
nervous breakdown. A Department of Police circular records a ‘lamentable episode’ in 
1909 in which the Okhrana warned a local Governor that terrorists were planning an 
attempt on his life. The anxiety prompted by this warning caused the unfortunate 
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Governor to die of a heart attack.44 Fear and stress undoubtedly contributed to the moral 
degeneration of a number of agents. Okhrana officers of the besieged Warsaw  and Riga 
sections were accused of torturing prisoners.45 
The root of this alleged ethical breakdown was the fact that the Okhrana occupied 
such an ambiguous position: as fanatical defenders of tsarism, working in confusingly 
close proximity to the revolutionary underground it was nigh on impossible for any 
security chief to pursue a lengthy career in this labyrinth of deceit without getting a little 
sullied in the working.  The lines between right and wrong, ally and enemy, reactionary 
and revolutionary were wholly blurred. Some of the leading police chiefs – such as 
S.V.Zubatov,46 P.I.Rachkovskii,47 M.E.Bakai,48 L.P.Menshchikov,49 and A.M.Harting.50 
– began their conspiratorial careers as revolutionaries. Zubatov’s trades unions spiralled 
out of control and were the direct cause of the 1905 revolution.51 Bakai and Menshchikov 
crossed back over to the revolutionary camp after 1905.  
In fact the secret police had always been locked in a strange symbiotic relationship 
of mutual fear and imitation with the revolutionary movement. Like the revolutionary 
movement it was a polycentric, amorphous entity, constantly evolving, defying simplistic 
definition. Like the revolutionary movement, the secret police traced its roots to the 
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Decembrist uprising of 1825. Each side largely existed because of the other. Both claimed 
to serve the interests of the people. Tsarist police repression was unleashed to combat 
violent radical opposition; and the radical opposition to the tsarist regime grew often 
because the regime unleashed police repression. People’s Will developed conspiratorial 
cells and the Okhrana trumped them with ‘an ultrasecret form of organising political 
investigations.’52 Nechaev conceived the ‘Revolutionary Catechism’ and gendarmerie 
responded by attempting to cultivate a ‘moral superiority over the enemy…[whereby] 
revolutionary fanaticism must be counterbalanced by fanatical loyalty to the service.’53 
Okhranniki claimed that the revolutionaries ‘preyed on the psychologically disturbed’54 in 
order to recruit new members. The same accusation could be levelled at the Okhrana’s 
methods of enlisting secret agents: ‘Some provocateurs,’ a police chief confessed, ‘exhibit 
an element of sadism… [they seek] to derive pleasure from a double degradation of 
people… To dominate people, to send them to the gallows, to play with them as a cat 
plays with a mouse.’55  
Both secret police and revolutionaries were prey to corrosive effects of prolonged 
submersion in the conspiratorial milieu: ‘The very way of life of the terrorist has a 
stupefying effect. It is the life of a hunted wolf… Apart from five to ten like-minded 
persons, one must deceive from morning to night literally everyone; one must hide from 
everyone, suspect in everyone an enemy… One needs extraordinary fortitude to think 
and work at all under such unnatural conditions. But even those who possess it, unless 
they extricate themselves quickly from the quagmire of their situation, quickly go under. 
For individuals of less calibre, these perpetual intrigues with spies, false passports, 
conspiratorial apartments, dynamites, ambushes, dreams of murders and escapes prove 
even more disastrous.’56  
 The secret police and revolutionary underground were so interconnected that it 
was not always entirely clear who benefited most from the actions of Okhrana spies. 
Vladimir Burtsev, a leading émigré opponent of tsarism, launched a campaign of counter-
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Okhrana publicity, whereby he persuaded a number of police agents to defect to the 
revolutionary camp and expose this ‘world of vileness and desolation’.57 Yet the exposés 
seem to have depressed and embarrassed the revolutionary movement more than it 
damaged the Okhrana. On the other hand, Roman Malinovskii’s election to the Duma 
had been made possible by the assistance of the Department of Police. In the Duma 
Malinovskii proved an inspiring orator, speaking on 22 occasions in the first session of the 
Fourth Duma and on 38 in the second session, he signed 54 interpellations and made five 
legislative proposals. This could hardly have been defined as doing only the bare 
minimum in order to preserve his cover. Lenin may well have been aware of and 
tolerated Malinovskii’s Okhrana connections because this police agent was so useful to 
the Bolshevik fraction. It is also odd that the most successful Okhrana spy, Evno Azef, was 
alleged to have masterminded a total of 28 terrorist attacks on government officials. 
Rumours circulated that the okhranniki were themselves ‘secret revolutionaries’ and that 
they plotted the assassination of rivals inside the government.  
 
A war against society 
A third and fatal flaw in the tsarist security police system was the fact that it was designed 
to isolate and remove individual troublemakers: to infiltrate and paralyse small, 
conspiratorial subversive groups. Yet the political struggle had widened exponentially by 
1905 and came to involve, to varying degrees, all sections of society. The cancer could no 
longer be dealt with by surgical extraction. Attempts to do so often only made matters 
worse and alienated moderates such as ex-police chief A.A.Lopukhin: ‘The whole 
political outlook of the ranks of the Corps of Gendarmes boils down to the following 
propositions,’ he wrote, ‘there is the people and there is the state... As a result [of this 
bipolar view], the protection of the state... turns into a war against all of society... By 
widening the gulf between the state and the people, the police engender a revolution.’58 
The upheavals of 1905 were the turning point in this regard. Peasant jacqueries 
ravaged central Russia from 1905-1907, destroying around 2000 estates. From 1905 to 
1910 alone over 9,000 persons were killed in ‘terrorist’ attacks, the overwhelming 
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majority of whom were government officials. The Okhrana specialised in the infiltration 
and suppression of small conspiratorial cells. Yet these attacks were, on the whole, not 
perpetrated by organised groups. Affiliates of the main pro-terror party– the SRs– 
claimed direct credit for less than ten terrorist attacks from 1901-1904, only 44 out of a 
total of 591 committed in 1905, 78 in 1906 and 62 in 1907.59 In the face of mass 
spontaneous violence the Okhrana’s subtle tactics tended to fall by the wayside: “either 
the revolutionaries will use us to adorn the Petersburg lamp-posts,” the capital’s Okhrana 
chief said, “or we must send them to jail and the gibbet.”60 St Petersburg Security Section 
directed the arrest of nearly 2000 people from 25 December 1905 to 25 January 1906. In 
all, the Interior Ministry arrested 70,000 people between October 1905 and April 1906. 
The pursuit of organised subversive groups inevitably spilled over into ordinary 
society as the these groups sought to hide behind various non-partisan legal 
organisations– such as trades unions, professional associations and pressure groups which 
were permitted to exist after the 1905 October Manifesto. Police repression from 1907 to 
1910 reduced the trade union movement in St Petersburg from 63,000 members (22% of 
the labour force) to 12,000 members (5% of the labour force). This created the unnerving 
impression, albeit erroneous, that the Okhrana was omniscient: ‘There was not a single 
party, nor a single mill, factory, nor a single organisation, nor society, union, club 
committee, university, institute, there was not even a single newspaper editorial staff in 
which among its members and collaborators there would not have been several secret 
agents.’61 
The Okhrana did not have the resources to combat mass opposition. 
Consequently, the military often had to be called in to lend a heavy-hand. The regime 
had to fall back on the services of the army on 1,500 occasions from 1883 to 1903 to curb 
large-scale public disturbances. This was a disastrously clumsy policy: soldiers do not 
usually make good policemen. It resulted in massacres in St Petersburg on 9 January 1905 
and in the Lena Goldfields in April 1912. From 1896 to 1912 3767 persons were 
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sentenced to death after summary trial by District Military Courts.62 Stolypin introduced 
even more extreme measures, under some pressure from the tsar, with the institution of 
the Field Courts Martial in August 1906. During the short duration of their existence 
these courts executed over 700 people a year. The tsarist military-police counter-
revolution claimed the lives of over 14,000 people in 1905 and 1906 alone. The tsarist 
regime executed a further 14,000 mostly through military tribunals in the last four 
decades of its existence. This level of violence may well have paled in comparison with 
subsequent upheavals; nevertheless, it was a bloody reign of brutality by the standards of 
the age. 
Relying on the armed forces to do the work of policemen was particularly 
troublesome because the army itself was not the reliable pillar of old: there had been over 
400 mutinies from 1905 to 1906. The Okhrana’s answer to this was to recruit spies inside 
the military in an attempt to expunge revolutionary influence. This caused a great deal of 
resentment among the army’s top brass. And they came to influence the security police 
when the gendarme ‘old school’ gained ascendancy inside the Okhrana in 1913 with the 
appointment of V.F.Dzhunkovskii as Assistant Minister of the Interior. Dzhunkovskii 
declared that the secret police should ‘sniff rather than stink.’ He launched what the press 
called a ‘purge’ of the Okhrana– sacking many leading security police officers. He slashed 
the police budget and ordered the dismissal of all spies in the army. This was a popular 
gesture but it critically weakened the state’s ability to monitor the reliability of the armed 
forces on the eve of war.  
In the end it was the war and not the revolutionary movement that was the 
undoing of the tsarist regime. The Okhrana recognised that society and state had little 
chance of surviving a protracted military conflict. The so-called Durnovo Memorandum 
to Nicholas II in February 1914, which seemed to predict the cause and course of all the 
later disasters, is perhaps the most striking evidence that the okhranniki fully understood the 
gravity of their situation. Imperial Russia was teetering on the edge of an abyss and 
security police measures would be insufficient should the regime fall over the brink. The 
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Okhrana zealously continued to do its job all the same and paralysed the organised 
opposition from 1914 to 1917. The professional revolutionaries were, after all, 
conspicuously absent from the February Revolution. ‘The development of mass 
revolutionary consciousness in the form of a commitment to a specific socialist party or 
political philosophies was fundamentally a phenomenon of the months after the fall of 
Nicholas II, when the politicisation of the masses began in earnest.’63 The Okhrana 
secured a futile victory: it had won the battle of wits against the revolutionary 
underground but lost the war. 
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